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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal has enough subsidiary procedural issues to 
bring a gleam to the eye of a civil procedure teacher. But 
there are two underlying issues that are dispositive-- the 
nonreviewability of a remand order and the appropriateness 
of an order staying a duplicative federal action. 
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I. 
 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This suit filed by Spring City Corp. arises out of the 
partial collapse of its building in Limerick, Pennsylvania, in 
1996 as the result of a heavy snow and ice fall. 
Construction of that building began in 1987. The 
companies participating in the project were Basile Corp. 
("Basile"), which was general contractor for the 
construction, Contractors of America, Inc. ("Contractors"), 
which supplied metal building components for the building, 
American Buildings Co. ("American"), which manufactured 
and delivered the building components, and Palmer 
Construction Co. ("Palmer"), which actually constructed the 
building. 
 
In September 1997, Spring City, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, filed suit in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas alleging negligence, breach of contract, and 
breach of warranty, based on the building collapse against 
Contractors, a New Jersey corporation, and its president, 
Lynn Bradeen, a New Jersey citizen. In November 1997, 
Contractors filed writs of summons pursuant to 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2252 against 
American, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Alabama, Palmer, a Pennsylvania corporation, 
and Basile, also a Pennsylvania corporation, to add them as 
third-party defendants. Under the Pennsylvania Rules, 
third-party defendants may be joined by writ or by formal 
complaint. See Pa. R. Civ. Proc. 2252(b). 
 
In December 1997, Spring City filed an amended 
complaint adding American as a defendant on one count. 
American then removed the action to federal court on the 
basis of diversity of citizenship. This case was assigned 
docket number 98-28. Also in December, Spring City filed 
a second action in state court, this one naming only 
American as a defendant. American removed this case as 
well, and it was assigned docket number 97-8127. Because 
there was diversity between Spring City and American, 
Spring City did not contest the removal of this 
second action. American subsequently filed a third-party 
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complaint asserting negligence and breach of warranty 
claims against Contractors, and Contractors filed a fourth- 
party action for contribution and indemnification against 
Palmer and Basile. Finally, in January 1998 Spring City 
filed a third action in federal court against American as the 
only defendant based on diversity of citizenship. This was 
assigned docket number 98-105. Again, there was no 
jurisdictional challenge in this federal case. As in No. 97- 
8127, American filed a third-party action against 
Contractors and Contractors filed a fourth-party action 
against Palmer and Basile. 
 
However, Spring City moved to remand No. 98-28 (the 
action in which, prior to removal, Palmer and Basile had 
been joined as third-party defendants under Rule 2252) to 
state court based on a lack of diversity and to stay the two 
remaining federal cases pending the resolution of the 
remanded case in state court. The District Court agreed 
with Spring City that there was no longer complete diversity 
in No. 98-28. Spring City Corp. v. Bradeen et al., Nos. 97- 
8127, 98-105, 98-28, slip op. at 6 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 1998) 
(hereafter "Slip op.") Therefore, the court granted the 
motion to remand No. 98-28 to the Pennsylvania state 
court. The court also ruled that as a result of the remand 
there would be parallel proceedings pending in state and 
federal courts. Slip op. at 9. After analyzing the factors 
outlined in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the court determined to 
grant Spring City's motion to stay the two remaining federal 
cases, No. 97-8127 and No. 98-105. Slip op. at 1. 
 
American filed a timely Notice of Appeal. It argues on 
appeal that (1) the citizenship of third-party defendants 
should not be considered in determining diversity, and (2) 
the District Court improperly applied Colorado River. It 
seeks reactivation on the federal docket of the stayed cases 
and reinstatement of the remanded case. 
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II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
The Order Remanding No. 98-28 
 
American challenges the District Court's finding that no 
diversity existed in No. 98-28 on the ground that complete 
diversity exists among what it considers the real`parties in 
the case, Spring City (plaintiff-appellee), Contractors 
(defendant), and American (defendant-appellant). American 
argues that the Pennsylvania citizenship of the two 
additional parties, Basile and Palmer, should not have been 
considered in determining diversity because they were 
solely "nominal" parties joined under state rules of 
procedure. 
 
Of course, Spring City rejects American's view and 
emphasizes that, when Palmer and Basile were joined, it 
gained substantive rights against them under Pa. Rule 
2255. Moreover, it states that it has recently acquired 
evidence, which it has submitted to this court, that 
defendant Contractors is incorporated in Pennsylvania and 
thus is non-diverse with Spring City.1  
 
In ruling that No. 98-28 should be remanded because 
there was no longer the requisite diversity of citizenship, 
the District Court noted the differences in the effect of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Spring City has requested leave to formally supplement the record 
with this evidence. Although appellate courts "do not take testimony, 
hear evidence or determine disputed facts," Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 
673 (3d Cir. 1990), subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental issue 
that a court is required to resolve, even where parties have not raised 
the issue, see Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 
217 (3d Cir. 1999), and even on appeal, see Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 
1356, 1360 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). It is thus likely that this court 
could consider the evidence about Contractor's Pennsylvania citizenship, 
even newly presented, but American conceded that fact at oral 
argument. In view of our disposition, however, we need not decide Spring 
City's motion. 
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joining a third-party defendant under the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Civil Procedure as distinguished from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Third-party pleading under Pa. R. 
Civ. Proc. 2255(d) allows a plaintiff to "recover from an 
additional defendant found liable to the plaintiff alone or 
jointly with the defendant as though such additional 
defendant had been joined as a defendant and duly served 
and the initial pleading of the plaintiff had averred such 
liability." Pa. R. Civ. Proc. 2255(d); see Sheriff v. Eisele, 381 
Pa. 33, 35, 112 A.2d 165, 166 (1955) (plaintiff 's claim has 
same effect as if additional defendant had originally been 
named a defendant without need to file a new pleading); 
Pappas v. Asbel, 450 Pa. Super. 162, 175, 675 A.2d 711, 
718 (Pa. Super. 1996) (joining an additional defendant 
makes that defendant immediately subject to the plaintiff 's 
claim in every respect). 
 
The District Court referred to other decisions of its 
colleagues holding that Rule 2255(d) destroys diversity by 
affording a plaintiff substantive rights against a third-party 
defendant. Slip op. at 6-7 (citing Adams v. Ford Motor Co. 
and Donna Lynn Peyton, Civ. A. No. 87-0524, 1987 WL 
13344 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1987) and Carey v. American 
Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 87-0100, 1987 WL 5726 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 23, 1987)). In contrast, a third-party defendant joined 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 does not become 
a defendant as against the original plaintiff, so that federal 
jurisdiction is not destroyed where those parties are 
citizens of the same state. See Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. 
Co., 173 F.2d 721, 724 n.2 (3d Cir. 1949). The District 
Court therefore held that when Bradeen and Contractors 
filed the writ of summons directed to Palmer and Basile, 
Palmer and Basile became additional defendants against 
whom Spring City had a direct right of recovery. Slip op. at 
6. 
 
American argues on appeal that in the context of 
removal, "federal law determines who is plaintiff and who is 
defendant," citing Chicago Rock Island & Pack R.R. Co. v. 
Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954). It argues that where the 
operation of a local procedural rule interferes with a federal 
statute, which it states Pa. Rule 2255 does, the local rule 
must yield. In response, Spring City argues that Rule 2255 
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gives the plaintiff a substantive right which, under Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts 
must apply in a diversity action. See Atlanta Int'l. Ins. Co. 
v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 786 F.2d 136, 140-141 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (applying Rule 2255 but calling results"ironic" 
and "illogical"). 
 
It would be intriguing to analyze the jurisdictional issues 
presented by the application of Pa. Rule 2255 in federal 
court and the recently discovered Pennsylvania citizenship 
of an original defendant. A review of the District Court's 
decision to remand on the basis of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction would require consideration whether the effect 
of Pa. Rule 2255(d) is to give Spring City a direct claim 
against the additional defendants Palmer and Basile even 
though Spring City has apparently not yet amended its 
complaint to assert such a claim, and, if so, whether the 
result is to destroy diversity of citizenship. We might then 
have to consider American's argument that application of 
the Pennsylvania Rule to destroy diversity jurisdiction is 
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. 
 
We cannot engage in these tantalizing arguments. We are 
precluded from doing so by 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d). That 
section of the Judicial Code provides: "An order remanding 
a case to the State court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . ." This prohibition is 
designed to prevent undue delay from the potentially 
constant appeal of remand orders. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 745 (3d Cir. 1995). It 
"severely circumscribes" an appellate court's authority to 
review most such remand orders. Id. 
 
We see no reason not to apply S 1447(d) to this case. The 
District Court based its remand on the lack of diversity 
among the parties, a "garden-variety, routine jurisdictional 
determination." Carr v. American Red Cross , 17 F.3d 671, 
682 (3d Cir. 1994). Remand in this case was "issued under 
S 1447(c) and invok[ed] the grounds specified therein--that 
removal . . . was without jurisdiction--[and is thus] 
immune from review under S 1447(d)." Trans Penn Wax 
Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d at 217, 222 (3rd Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Thermtron Prods. Inc. v. Hermansdorfer , 423 U.S. 
336, 346 (1976)); see also Things Remembered, Inc. v. 
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Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1995) ("As long as a district 
court's remand is based on a timely raised defect in 
removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
--the grounds for remand recognized by S 1447(c)--a court 
of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the 
remand order under S 1447(d)."). 
 
American relies on Chicago Rock Island & Pack R.R. Co. 
v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954), for its argument that we can 
consider the remand. In Chicago, a railroad challenged a 
condemnation award by filing separate suits in federal and 
state court. The railroad, which was nominally a defendant 
in the state action, removed that action to federal court. 
The district court subsequently granted the landowner's 
motion to dismiss the case filed in federal court but denied 
its motion to remand the state case. Each party appealed. 
 
The Supreme Court held that although orders denying 
motions to remand are interlocutory and ordinarily not 
reviewable until final judgment, the two suits were 
functionally identical and had been treated as one case by 
the parties and the lower court. As a result, the Court 
treated both appeals as taken in a single case that had 
culminated in a final order -- dismissal -- which is patently 
appealable. Id. at 578. 
 
Here, neither the parties nor the District Court have 
treated the three actions as one, nor would it have been 
appropriate for them to do so. More importantly, although 
orders granting motions to remand are interlocutory and 
thus not subject to appeal as final orders, see 16 Moore's 
Federal Practice S 107 App. 113[2][a] (Matthew Bender 3d 
ed.) (citing Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. 507 (1874)), 
S 1447(d) provides an additional, broader prohibition on 
review. Courts have excepted from this prohibition remand 
orders based on factors other than those listed inS 1447(c), 
see Trans Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 222, and orders predicated 
"on a substantive decision on the merits of a collateral 
issue." 16 Moore's Federal Practice S 107.44[2][a][ii]; see 
also Carr, 17 F.3d at 682-83 (finding remand order 
reviewable "where a separable and final determination . . ., 
whether substantive or jurisdictional, . . . triggers a 
remand") (emphasis added). This case fits neither exception. 
The District Court may have addressed fascinating 
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procedural issues, but it did so solely in making a "garden- 
variety, routine jurisdictional determination." Carr, 17 F.3d 
at 682. 
 
It follows that we will dismiss so much of American's 
appeal as challenges the remand of No. 98-28. 
 
B. 
 
The Order Staying Nos. 97-8127 and 98-105 
 
American also appeals from the District Court's order 
staying the two pending federal cases, Nos. 97-8127 and 
98-105, arguing that the court erred in applying the 
Colorado River doctrine. We must first consider whether the 
stay order is appealable. Ordinarily, a stay is not a "final 
decision" of the district court. The established definition of 
a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. S 1291 is that it 
"ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment." Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 
In Michelson v. Citicorp National Services, Inc. , 138 F.3d 
508 (3rd Cir. 1998), we discussed the circumstances under 
which a stay order may be considered final and appealable. 
If the stay simply defers or postpones resolution of an 
action in federal court, then it is only a temporary measure 
not subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Id. at 513. 
However, when a district court relies on the Colorado River 
doctrine to stay a case in federal court because it is 
duplicative with a state court proceeding, such a stay will 
generally have the "practical effect of a dismissal," id., by 
putting a party "effectively out of [federal] court." Moses H. 
Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 
n.8 (1983). Although we have previously stated that the 
argument that any Colorado River stay is per se appealable 
is "not without basis," Michelson, 138 F.3d at 514, we have 
instead applied the finality analysis of Moses H. Cone, 
which entails "inquiry into the effect of the district court's 
stay to ascertain whether the court has surrendered its 
jurisdiction to a state court," and whether a decision in 
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state court would have preclusive effect on the federal 
action. Id. 
 
Here, as American argues, resolution of the remanded 
case in state court will have a preclusive effect on the 
stayed cases. American, which is a primary defendant in 
the stayed cases, has been joined as a third-party 
defendant in the remanded case. Under the Pennsylvania 
joinder rules, Spring City now has a direct claim against it 
just as though American had been a defendant originally. 
Pa. R. Civ. Proc. 2255(d). Thus, a determination of liability 
in the remanded case will be res judicata for the federal 
cases, and, as a result, American has been put "effectively 
out of [federal] court." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 n.8. It 
follows that the order staying the two federal cases is final 
and appealable. We turn therefore to the merits of that 
order. 
 
In determining whether the situation before it fell within 
the Supreme Court's abstention doctrine enunciated in 
Colorado River, the District Court first determined that the 
remanded state action and the federal actions are parallel 
because both lawsuits concern the collapse of the roof, 
virtually the same parties are involved, and the state 
litigation will dispose of all of the claims raised in the 
federal case. Slip op. at 8-9. The court then stated that the 
decision fell within its discretionary power. In making that 
decision, the court outlined the following six factors 
referred to in Colorado River, Moses H. Cone, and Third 
Circuit cases: "(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction 
over property; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) 
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order 
in which jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether federal or 
state law controls; and (6) whether the state court will 
adequately protect the interests of the parties." Slip op. at 
9-10. 
 
The District Court then determined that three of those 
factors "weigh[ed] heavily in favor of staying" the federal 
cases: avoiding piecemeal litigation, the fact that state law 
rather than federal law controls the issues, and the fact 
that a state court will adequately protect the parties' 
interests. Slip op. at 11. The District Court considered 
irrelevant the three other factors that form the test: which 
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court first asserted jurisdiction over the issue, the potential 
inconvenience of the federal forum, and the order in which 
jurisdiction was obtained. In holding that the stay was 
warranted, the District Court noted that the stay was 
"based on principles of judicial economy and sound judicial 
administration" recognized in Colorado River. 
 
We cannot disagree that it would be more efficient to hold 
the federal cases in abeyance until the conclusion of the 
state case. But Colorado River abstention must be 
grounded on more than just the interest in avoiding 
duplicative litigation. In Colorado River, the duplicative 
litigation involved allocation of water rights in Colorado, one 
of the most critical issues in the Southwest. The United 
States had brought suit in federal court as trustee for 
certain Indian tribes seeking determination of water rights. 
Pursuant to authority granted by the McCarran 
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. S 666, the United States was joined 
as a defendant in a state proceeding under the Colorado 
Water Rights Determination and Administration Act. The 
district court held that under the circumstances, it should 
abstain in the federal action. When the Supreme Court 
considered the case, it agreed that abstention was 
appropriate in light of the clear federal policy embodied in 
the McCarran Act to avoid piecemeal adjudication of water 
rights. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion in Colorado River 
made clear that "exceptional circumstances" are required to 
justify abstention. 424 U.S. at 813. 
 
We analyzed this issue in Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 
193, 197 (3d Cir. 1997), where we noted that in Moses H. 
Cone the Supreme Court reiterated the narrowness of 
Colorado River. We pointed out that even though it is 
important to prevent "piecemeal litigation," a stay is 
appropriate only when there is a "strong federal policy 
against [such] litigation." Id. at 197. This has long been our 
precedent. In University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main 
& Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1991), we stated, "The 
general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of similar 
issues in both state and federal courts is that both actions 
may proceed until one has come to judgment, at which 
point that judgment may create a res judicata or collateral 
estoppel effect on the other action." 
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In support of the District Court's decision to abstain, 
Spring City argues that there is a vital state interest in the 
construction of safe buildings, that lifting the stay will 
result in piecemeal litigation, that only state laws are at 
issue, and that the state court assumed jurisdictionfirst 
and will adequately protect the parties' rights. It also 
accuses American of forum-shopping in order to "receive a 
favorable ruling with respect to the economic loss doctrine." 
Spring City's Brief at 36-37. American responds that if the 
fact that state law controls in this case mandated a stay, 
virtually any diversity case in which state law"was not 
entirely settled" would merit Colorado River  abstention. As 
we stated in Ryan, just as "abstention cannot be justified 
merely because a case arises entirely under state law," the 
question whether parties' interests are protected is only 
relevant when they are not; that is, "when the state court 
is adequate, . . . [this] factor carries little weight." Ryan, 
115 F.3d at 199, 200. 
 
Spring City relies on this court's decision in Trent v. Dial 
Medical of Florida, Inc., 33 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1994), where 
we affirmed the stay of a duplicative federal proceeding. In 
Ryan, however, we recognized that Trent, by focusing 
principally on the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, was 
inconsistent with our earlier decisions and the Supreme 
Court's emphasis in Colorado River and Moses H. Cone that 
a "strongly articulated congressional policy against 
piecemeal litigation" is required to justify a stay. Ryan, 115 
F.3d at 198. We were concerned that were we to follow 
what appears to be Trent's emphasis on "piecemeal 
litigation," we would "swallow[ ] up the century-old principle 
. . . that the pendency of an action in the state court is no 
bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the 
Federal court having jurisdiction." Id. (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). We held in Ryan that 
under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1, our 
prior case law takes precedence over an inconsistent later 
case. Id. 
 
We agree and hold that Ryan represents the applicable 
law under Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. In 
Ryan, we narrowly construed the circumstances that would 
qualify for abstention, emphasizing language in Colorado 
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River that an abstention, even for "considerations of wise 
judicial administration . . . can be justified . .. only in the 
exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to 
repair to the state court would clearly serve an important 
countervailing interest." Id. at 195-96 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
We see nothing in the present case that constitutes the 
"exceptional circumstances" that would warrant abstention 
under Colorado River. We respect the considerations that 
caused the District Court to enter the stay but hold it erred 
in doing so. The parties have advised us that the state case 
is proceeding expeditiously. We are confident that the 
District Court can establish procedures in the federal cases 
that will minimize duplication of effort. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we reiterate that federal courts have a 
"virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. 
For the reasons set forth, we will dismiss so much of this 
appeal as challenges the remand of No. 98-28, reverse the 
order staying the federal actions, and remand the 
remainder of this suit to the District Court. Each party to 
bear its own costs. 
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